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Recent evidence suggests that solving problems through insight can enhance long-term 
memory for the problem and its solution. Previous findings have shown that generation of 
the solution as well as experiencing a feeling of Aha! can have a beneficial relationship to 
later memory. These findings lead to the question of how learning in problem-solving tasks 
in which a novel solution needs to be generated—such as in tasks used to study insight— 
differs from the classical generation effect. Because previous studies on learning from insight 
on one hand and the generation effect on the other hand have measured different types of 
memory, the present study examined two kinds of memory measures: indirect (solving old 
and new problems at test) and direct (recognition memory). At encoding, we manipulated 
whether participants had the chance to solve Compound Remote Associates Task items and 
compared later memory for generated solutions (generate condition) to solutions that were 
presented after failing to generate one (fail-to-generate condition), and to solutions that 
were presented without a chance at generation (read condition). Participants also reported 
if they had an Aha! experience for each problem. While both Aha! experiences and gener-
ated solutions were associated with more positive emotional responses, only the generation 
variable was associated with differences in later memory performance. While attempts to 
generate had an advantage over the read condition in recognition memory performance 
(generate > fail-to-generate > read), only when generation was successful did it enhance 
the solution rate of old items during testing (generate > read > fail-to-generate). Contrary to 
generation effects with other verbal stimuli, these results suggest that the generation effect 
in problem-solving tasks in which a novel solution needs to be found differs from the classi-
cal generation effect. Seeing a correct solution for a longer time (read) seems in the current 
case to be more helpful for solving the same problem later on, compared to being presented 
with the solution after a failed attempt at problem solving.
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Previous findings suggest that solving problems through 
insight can enhance later memory for the problem and solution 
(Ash, Jee, & Wiley, 2012; Danek, Fraps, von Müller, Grothe, 
& Öllinger, 2013a; Dominowski & Buyer, 2000; Kizilirmak, 
Galvao Gomes da Silva, Imamoglu, & Richardson-Klavehn, 
2015). The core definition of an insight, as considered in this 
paper, is the sudden comprehension of a relationship that until 
that moment appeared incomprehensible. A famous example of 
such a sudden insight is the anecdote of Archimedes’s discov-
ery of the relationship between the volume submerged and the 
water level rising by stepping into the bathtub. In a previous 
study employing a pictorial problem-solving task, successfully 
generating a solution as compared to being presented with a 
solution after failing to generate one, experiencing insight (i.e., 
a feeling of Aha! consisting of surprise and being convinced of 
the truth of the solution) as compared to no insight, and the pos-
itive emotional response to successful generation and insight, 
were all beneficially related to learning (Kizilirmak et al., 
2015). Here, we further illuminate the impact of generating a 
solution to a problem by additionally examining a “no-chance-
to-solve” condition in which the solution was immediately 
provided together with the problem, thus bypassing the chance 
to generate, thereby linking our study more closely with the 
numerous traditional memory studies on the generation effect 
(see next subsection). Moreover, a verbal problem-solving 
task is used, the Compound Remote Associates Task (CRAT), 
because verbal stimulus material has usually been used to study 
the generation effect. The CRAT has been utilized to investi-
gate insightful problem solving in other studies (e.g., Bowden 
& Jung-Beeman, 2003; Cranford & Moss, 2010). In the current 
study, the subjective Aha! experience and performance on the 
CRAT (i.e., generating versus not generating the correct solu-
tion to a problem) are both examined in relation to later mem-
ory for solutions.
http://dx.doi.org/10.7771/1932-6246.1182
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The GeneraTion effecT
While the subjective Aha! experience may be unique to 
insight, the generation of a solution and its positive relation-
ship to later memory are not. The beneficial effect of insight 
on learning is therefore likely partially based on the positive 
effect of generation on long-term memory formation. The so-
called generation effect describes the superiority of generated 
items (generate condition) over presented items (read condi-
tion) regarding later long-term memory performance (Burns, 
1992; Slamecka & Graf, 1978). The generate condition typi-
cally involves the production of a word, such as coming up 
with a semantic associate or completing a word fragment. 
The processes behind the beneficial effect of generation on 
memory encoding are not completely understood, but it is 
generally agreed that better semantic integration plays an 
important role (McElroy & Slamecka, 1982; Slamecka & Graf, 
1978). Higher cognitive effort and a deeper level of process-
ing have also been considered, but insufficient evidence has 
been found to support those claims (Bertsch, Pesta, Wiscott, 
& McDaniel, 2007). The key question arises as to whether 
the generation effect in problem solving is a special case of the 
generation effect or just a typical case of the generation effect.
The generation effect is investigated by comparing a gener-
ate condition in which the target item has to be produced by 
the participant, with a read condition, in which the target item 
does not need to be generated by the participant but is instead 
presented. The read condition does not necessarily imply verbal 
item material. It has only become convention to call the condi-
tion in which the stimulus is directly presented “read,” because 
early generation effect studies used verbal material. The gen-
eration rule is typically easy enough so that the vast majority 
of the items can be successfully generated, in order to avoid an 
item selection effect, that is, where only easy items are success-
fully generated (Gardiner, Java, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1996; 
Slamecka & Graf, 1978).1  For most problem-solving tasks that 
are used to investigate insight, this is not the case. These types 
of items require creative thinking and are often made to be 
almost unsolvable via normal analytical problem-solving strat-
egies (e.g., Mednick, 1962). Typically, a representational change 
is required to solve the item, that is, to look at the problem 
and solution space from a different angle (Knoblich, Ohlsson, 
Haider, & Rhenius, 1999). Hence, especially with the time limit 
required in laboratory experiments, and with some individu-
als being more creative than others, it cannot be avoided that 
a considerable number of items are not going to be solved. 
In problem-solving tasks used to investigate insight one will 
therefore not only have a generate and read condition, but also 
most certainly a considerable number of fail-to-generate trials.
One study on the classical generation effect also consid-
ered a fail-to-generate condition and showed that later mem-
ory is still higher for fail-to-generate than for read, given that 
the correct response is provided after a failed attempt to gen-
erate (Slamecka & Fevreiski, 1983). Slamecka and Fevreiski 
found that when people were asked to generate the oppo-
sites for words, fail-to-generate enhanced free recall per-
formance (compared to read) 24 hours later as much as did 
generate (generate = fail-to-generate > read). In comparison, 
fail-to-generate did not enhance recognition memory perfor-
mance as much as generate, although it was still better than 
read (generate > fail-to-generate > read). The authors pro-
posed that a word’s semantic-associative attributes have to be 
activated for subsequent recall to be successful, which may 
also be the case for fail-to-generate, which was proposed to 
represent incomplete generation. Incomplete generation was 
thought of as the generation of semantic attributes of the solu-
tion without arriving at the proper lexical entry. Therefore, 
recognition memory, which relies on both surface and seman-
tic properties of the word, benefits less from fail-to-generate 
than does free recall. Whether fail-to-generate can also be 
considered to represent incomplete generation in problem-
solving tasks that have mainly been used to study insight, is 
an important question that may dissociate generation effects 
on this type of problem from the classical generation effect. 
Considering that first ideas about the solution are often mis-
leading and that problem-solving attempts for CRAT prob-
lems frequently lead to an impasse that needs to be overcome 
(Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 1998; Chein & Weisberg, 2014; 
Cranford & Moss, 2012; Hoffman & Subramaniam, 1995), the 
fail-to-generate condition in a CRAT problem-solving para-
digm may not benefit from incomplete generation.
The aha! experience and LaTer MeMory
As previously mentioned, the occurrence of the subjective 
Aha! experience is often associated with performance in 
certain problem-solving tasks, such as the CRAT. Recent 
studies on insight have assessed the experience of such an 
Aha! moment by asking the participants about it, and have 
also shown that later memory performance for problems 
encoded with Aha! is better than for problems encoded with-
out Aha! (Danek et al., 2013a; Dominowski & Buyer, 2000; 
Kizilirmak et al., 2015). Such an Aha! experience is typically 
defined as the comprehension of the solution being sudden 
and unexpected—that participants are completely convinced 
of the correctness of the solution, and that the solution is in 
hindsight being experienced as easy and very clear (Danek, 
Fraps, von Müller, Grothe, & Öllinger, 2014; Topolinski & 
Reber, 2010). Also, the Aha! experience is often accompa-
nied by a positive feeling. Previous studies that investigated 
insight and learning have focused on the re-solution effect, 
in other words the ability to solve problems which have been 
solved via an insight during an encoding phase, and again 
during a testing phase (Ash et al., 2012; Dominowski & 
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Buyer, 2000). It has been reported that solution times were 
significantly reduced and solution rates were significantly 
higher for previously solved problems. However, re-solving 
problems is only one way to assess learning success. More 
importantly, generation effect studies have generally used a 
different type of memory measure, as explained under the 
subsection “Direct Versus Indirect Memory Tests.”
In most studies in which the Aha! experience has been 
assessed, this is only done for generated solutions. Generated 
solutions with Aha! are then designated as “insight” solu-
tions. However, Kizilirmak et al. (2015) asked participants 
whether they experienced an Aha! moment not only when 
they generated a solution, but also when they failed to do so 
and were shown the solution instead. The definition of an 
Aha! experience was phrased such that generation was not 
a necessary precondition; the solution could still be compre-
hended suddenly, appearing utterly convincing and clear as 
day when it was comprehended after it was presented follow-
ing a failed attempt at problem solving. Using this procedure, 
Kizilirmak et al. (2015) found that the Aha! experience was 
accompanied by a more positive feeling and better mem-
ory performance independent of whether the solution to a 
problem was generated or not. Thus, in the current study 
participants were asked whether they experienced an Aha! 
both when they successfully solved a problem on their own 
and when they did not. The main design difference from the 
prior study was that the addition of the equivalent of a read 
condition in the generation-effect studies, in which the solu-
tion was presented immediately, and the participant there-
fore had no chance to find the solution on their own.
direcT Versus indirecT MeMory TesTs
There are different ways in which long-term memory can be 
tested, and as seen in Slamecka and Fevreiski (1983), differ-
ent measures may be more affected by generation than oth-
ers. One could classify the different types of tests as direct 
and indirect memory tests (see Richardson-Klavehn & 
Bjork, 1988, and Richardson-Klavehn, 2010, for extensive 
overviews). A test is considered direct/intentional when it 
is clearly stated in the instructions for the participant that 
memory content should be recalled/recognized. Such tests 
are thought to mainly tap into controlled, voluntary retrieval 
processes. On the other hand, a test is considered to be indi-
rect or incidental when the task can in principle be solved 
based on current skills and knowledge without the neces-
sity to make mental reference to previous experimental 
episodes. The instructions for such tests do not include the 
instruction to remember anything from a previous experi-
mental learning episode; indeed, participants may even be 
explicitly instructed to ignore episodic memory. Such indi-
rect memory tests are thought to mainly tap into automatic, 
involuntary retrieval processes, and it has even been found 
that they sometimes show evidence of memory even when 
participants lack consciousness of the prior episodes whose 
influence is being revealed in their performance.
Nevertheless, it is very important to make a distinction 
between the type of test (as defined objectively by instruc-
tions) and the type of retrieval process accessed by the 
test (see Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988). Although 
the instructions are those of an indirect or incidental test, 
the participants might not only use involuntary retrieval 
processes to solve the task. For example, consider an experi-
ment in which participants try to solve puzzles in a first ses-
sion (learning phase) and are tested on solving those same 
puzzles and new ones in a second session (memory test). The 
test instructions do not say that they should try to remember 
the solutions to those problems from the first session. While 
solving old problems, participants could involuntarily benefit 
from their previous encounter with the problems. However, it 
could also be that they consciously recognize an old problem 
and voluntarily recall the previous solution. It could even be 
that they first unconsciously use their knowledge from their 
previous encounter with an old problem until they realize this 
consciously and then voluntarily recall the previously learned 
information. Similarly, direct or intentional memory tests can 
also profit from involuntary memory. Thus, one can only say 
that direct and indirect memory tests predominantly tap into 
more voluntary versus more involuntary retrieval processes, 
respectively. There are ways to clearly dissociate voluntary 
and involuntary retrieval processes (Richardson-Klavehn 
& Bjork, 1988; Richardson-Klavehn, 2010; see Schott et al., 
2005, for neural evidence), but such a dissociation was not 
attempted in the current study.
Most relevant here is that in the problem-solving litera-
ture, learning from insight has been mainly investigated with 
indirect or incidental memory tests. The memory benefit 
from repeatedly solving old items has been termed the re-
solution effect (Dominowski & Buyer, 2000). The generation 
effect, by contrast, has been investigated with many differ-
ent types of memory tests, of which most can be considered 
direct or intentional memory tests. In the 86 studies analyzed 
in the meta-analysis by Bertsch et al. (2007), the memory 
test was either a recognition memory test (e.g., an item is 
presented, and an old or new decision has to be made), a 
cued-recall test (e.g., one word of a previously studied word 
pair is shown, and the other word has to be retrieved), or 
a free recall test (all studied stimuli have to be recalled in 
any order). The current study, therefore, employed both 
direct/intentional and indirect/incidental memory tests to 
gain insight into both relatively more voluntary as well as 
relatively more involuntary forms of memory for previously 
encountered CRAT problems. Doing so created a further 
bridge between problem-solving and memory studies.
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aiMs of The currenT sTudy
The aim of the two experiments was to investigate the effects 
of having the chance to try to solve a CRAT problem, or not 
having the chance to solve the problem at all, with the solu-
tion being immediately presented, on long-term memory for-
mation. Moreover, the chance-to-solve category was divided, 
post-hoc, into successful generation (note that incorrect gen-
erations were infrequent and not further analyzed) and failed 
generation (there was no solution at all within the time limit, 
but a solution was presented as feedback), and further split for 
all categories as to whether an Aha! was experienced or not. 
The studies employed a version of the Compound Remote 
Associates Task (CRAT) which was adapted from Bowden and 
Jung-Beeman (2003), whose task was based on the Remote 
Associates Task originally designed by Mednick (1962) to test 
creativity in students. In the CRAT, three nouns (i.e., a triad) 
are presented that have no obvious association and are there-
fore considered to be remote associates, for example: manners, 
cloth, and tennis. Close associates, such as tennis-racquet, to 
single triad words are even misleading (for the solution, see 
Figure 1 below). The task is to find a fourth word that can be 
used to build compound words with each of the other three, 
thereby building a connection between all four words. Two 
different measures of later memory were used to evaluate rela-
tionships to the encoding conditions just described: (1) more 
involuntary memory by means of an indirect memory test of 
solutions (Experiment 1), and (2) more voluntary memory by 
means of a direct memory test in which an old or new deci-
sion was performed either on the complete item (Experiment 
1) or on the solution word alone (Experiment 2). The experi-
ments were similar in the encoding phase, but differed in 
regard to the memory tests. Learning was incidental because 
participants were not informed that their memory would be 
tested later on. The indirect memory test (Experiment 1) was 
designed to primarily assess the involuntary retrieval of the 
solution upon the presentation of the triad, and therefore 
assessed the encoding of the association between problem 
and solution, whereas the intentional memory test primarily 
assessed episodic memory, either for the triad in combination 
with its solution (Experiment 1), or for the solution without 
the presence of the triad (Experiment 2). The indirect memory 
test in Experiment 1 was most comparable with Slamecka’s and 
Fevreiski’s free recall procedure, because both heavily rely on 
activation spread in associative memory networks (Collins & 
Loftus, 1975), whereas the direct memory test was comparable 
to Slamecka’s and Fevreiski’s recognition procedure.
hypoTheses
Participants were expected to engage in semantic process-
ing in all conditions, because the connection between the 
four words needed to be understood in all of them. It was 
further hypothesized that the resulting association between 
the triad and solution would vary in degree. As the semantic- 
associative processing ends successfully in the generate condi-
tion, the association between the triad and solution should be 
strongly enhanced. However, in contrast to classical generation 
effect studies that employ tasks in which the solution may be 
found by analytical problem solving, with successive attempts 
gradually coming closer to the solution, thinking of close associa-
tions with the triad words in the CRAT is not supposed to lead to 
the solution. Thus, memory performance in the fail-to-generate 
condition for CRAT problems may differ from the benefit seen in 
the Slamecka and Fevreiski study (1983), because the semantic- 
associative processing does not directly lead closer to the solu-
tion. It was hypothesized that failing to generate the solution 
might even lead to interference between the correct solution and 
the incorrect solutions processed during failed problem solving 
(Kane & Anderson, 1978). As incorrect solutions are not con-
sidered by the participant in the read condition, the association 
between the correct solution and triad might be even stronger than 
in the fail-to-generate condition. For the indirect memory 
test that relies on associative memory, the following line-up 
of memory performance may be expected: generate > read > 
fail-to-generate. Alternatively, if searching for the solution leads 
to spreading activation that eventually reaches the correct remote 
association that is the solution word, which then suddenly emerges 
into consciousness (Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990), 
the same pattern as found by Slamecka and Fevreiski (1983) could 
be expected: generate = fail-to-generate > read.
Regarding the direct memory test that relies on recogni-
tion memory, the hypothesis matched the order reported by 
Slamecka and Fevreiski (generate > fail-to-generate > read), 
because recognition, if mainly based on a feeling of famil-
iarity, should not depend on the strength of the association 
between triad and solution. This pattern would be especially 
expected when recognition is tested for the solution word alone 
(Experiment 2). However, recollection does depend on remem-
bering some details about the encoding episode (Gardiner, 
Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1998), for which relational 
encoding is especially important (Yonelinas & Ritchey, 2015). 
Moreover, emotional arousal during stimulus encoding has 
specifically been reported to enhance recollection (Anderson, 
Yamaguchi, Grabski, & Lacka, 2006; Yonelinas & Ritchey, 2015). 
It would therefore be plausible that recollection will be better for 
more emotional encoding episodes (generate: feeling of success; 
fail-to-generate: frustration, disappointment). Thus, if recogni-
tion memory performance is mainly based on recollection, gen-
erate and fail-to-generate at encoding might result in better later 
memory than read (generate = fail-to-generate > read).
As mentioned earlier, in addition to generation, the sub-
jective experience of insight during the comprehension of 
the solution on memory for solutions was also analyzed. 
This was done by asking participants whether they had an 
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Aha! experience and how happy or unhappy they felt dur-
ing comprehension. The subjective Aha! experience has been 
investigated in insight studies before, and suggests a qualita-
tive difference not only during the processing of the solution 
(Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2006), but also in 
relation to later memory performance (Danek et al., 2013a; 
Kizilirmak et al., 2015). Based on previous findings (Danek 
et al., 2013a; Kizilirmak et al., 2015), Aha! experiences were 
expected to be associated with a relatively better memory per-
formance, compared to solutions understood without Aha!
Because the Aha! experience is usually described to be 
accompanied by a positive feeling (Danek et al., 2013a; Jung-
Beeman et al., 2004), it was hypothesized that the generate 
condition and Aha! experiences would be associated with a 
more positive emotional response than the fail-to-generate 
and read conditions, and no Aha! experiences, with fail-
to-generate possibly evoking a more negative emotional 
response than read. Such a finding would validate the intrin-
sically rewarding aspect of the Aha! experience.
experiMenT 1
The main aim of Experiment 1 was to test the relationship 
between (1) generate, fail-to-generate, and read solutions, and 
(2) the subjective feeling of Aha! or its absence, with later mem-
ory performance measured with both an indirect and a direct 
test after one week. The indirect test measured the solution rate 
of old items, in comparison to the solution rate of new items. The 
direct test measured the rate of items (their solution included) 
correctly recognized as old. These tests were combined to form 
a hybrid test (see Richardson-Klavehn, 2010; Schott et al., 2005), 
with an indirect and then a direct test on each test item.
MeThods
Participants
Participants were 21 German native speakers (7 male, 14 
female) with a mean age of 24.1 years (SD = 2.4, range: 20–28). 
They participated after giving written informed consent. 
Participants were informed that they had the right to abort the 
experiment at any time without any negative personal conse-
quences. Participation was paid with 6 Euros per hour. At the 
end of the experiment, participants were debriefed on request 
about the purpose of the study. Five participants were excluded 
from statistical analysis of the GENERATION (generate, fail-
to-generate, read) × AHA (Aha!, no Aha!) fully crossed design, 
because of empty cells in some conditions. The remaining 16 
participants (4 male, 12 female) had a mean age of 23.7 years 
and were all university students or had a university degree.
Stimulus material and apparatus
A German adaptation of the CRAT (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 
2003) with 180 items was used for the experiment. All items 
consisted of nouns or color words. The solution could either 
be used as a prefix or a suffix with each of the triad words to 
form a compound word. Table 1 shows three examples. Some 
items were homogeneous, i.e., the solution could be affixed 
to all of the triad words in the same way (only as a prefix or 
only as a suffix, see Example 1, Table 1), while others were 
heterogeneous, that is, whether the solution could be used 
as a prefix or suffix varied between the triad words (Example 
2, Table 1). Since the authors of the original task found no 
performance difference between heterogeneous and homo-
geneous items, these were kept approximately equal. Due to 
the nature of the German language, in some cases one word 
needed to be slightly modified to form a compound word 
with another (see Example 3, Table 1, “Meile” and “Stein” can 
be combined to “Meilenstein”). Solution words were never 
repeated or used as triad words. Triad words were rarely 
repeated but not more than twice.
On the basis of unpublished normative data, the lists were 
split into four sublists that matched regarding (1) the solu-
tion rate, (2) plausibility, and (3) the probability of an Aha! 
experience accompanying comprehension of the solution. 
Two lists were assigned to the chance-to-generate condi-
tion (90 items, later split into generate and fail-to-generate 
based on participants’ responses), one list to the no-chance- 
to-generate (read) condition in which the solution was 
Triad words Solution word Compund word
(1) Manieren, Tennis, Tuch Tisch Tischmanieren, Tischtennis, Tischtuch
manners, tennis, cloth table table manners, table tennis, table
(2) Stufe, System, Feuer Alarm Alarmstufe, Alarmsystem, Feueralarm
level, system, fire alarm alarm level, alarm system, fire alarm
(3) Kiesel, Meile, Zeit Stein Kieselstein, Meilenstein, Steinzeit
pebble, mile, age stone pebble stone, mile stone, stone age
Table 1
Examples of Compound Remote Associate items.
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immediately presented (45 items), and one list was used as 
new items in the memory test (45 items). The assignment of 
lists to conditions was counterbalanced across participants 
by means of a reduced Latin square. However, as some par-
ticipants were excluded from data analysis, the assignment 
of lists to participants employed a compromise of following 
the Latin square while still acquiring enough participants per 
condition for the analysis.
The Aha! or no Aha! decision was made on the basis of a 
written definition of the subjective Aha! experience, which 
was provided as part of the instruction for the learning 
phase. The definition of the Aha! experience read approxi-
mately as follows (translated from German) and was based 
on the criteria listed by Topolinski and Reber (2010), with 
the exception of the “positive emotional response” criterion 
because this was evaluated separately:
By ‘aha!’ experience we are referring to the feeling of a 
sudden insight, that is, the surprising comprehension 
for a previously seemingly unsolvable problem. At this 
moment of insight, you are convinced of the correct-
ness of the solution. The solution suddenly appears 
to be as plain as day. If you find the solution on your 
own, you are usually unaware of how it came into  
your mind. The described feeling of ‘aha!’ does not have 
to be overwhelming, but should closely correspond to 
this description.
The emotional response to comprehending the solution 
was measured by means of a 5-point graphical smiley inter-
val scale (numerical values: -2 to +2) ranging from very sad 
(mouth: upper half of a circle, -2) to neutral (mouth: flat hori-
zontal line, 0) to very happy (mouth: lower half of a circle, +2).
A standard desktop PC with Windows XP (Microsoft, 
Redmond Campus, Washington, USA) was used and stim-
uli were presented on a 19” TFT screen with a 60 Hz frame 
rate and 1280 × 1024 pixels resolution. Stimulus presenta-
tion and collection of behavioral data were controlled with 
Presentation 16.3 (Neurobehavioral Systems, Berkeley, CA). 
All responses were made with a standard USB keyboard. 
Statistics were analyzed with SPSS 22 and 23 for Windows 7 
64-bit (IBM, Armonk, NY, USA) and the effect size calculator 
(used to calculate Cohen’s d provided by Melody Wiseheart 
on http://www.cognitiveflexibility.org/effectsize).
Design 
The design was a 3 × 2 within-subjects design. Of main inter-
est was the relationship between GENERATION (generated, 
fail-to-generate, read), AHA (Aha!, no Aha!), and later mem-
ory performance (either the solution rate of old items, or the 
recognition rate of old items) and on the emotional response 
during the comprehension of the solution. A priori, two con-
ditions formed an experimentally manipulated variable: items 
with a chance to generate a solution, whereby the solution was 
either successfully generated or was, in the case of generation 
failure, provided after a time limit ran out, and items with an 
immediately provided solution and thus no chance to gen-
erate (read condition). The former were post-hoc split into 
generate (correctly solved) and fail-to-generate (no solution 
within time limit). Incorrect solutions were discarded from 
analysis. Memory performance was tested in two ways: first, 
with an indirect memory test, in which subjects were asked to 
try solving old and new problems regardless of whether they 
were perceived as old or new, followed by a direct memory 
test, that is, an old or new recognition memory task.
To avoid the perceived plausibility of any provided solu-
tion complicating the results due to, for example, individual 
differences in vocabulary, we asked participants to make a 
plausible or implausible judgment for each item (see Figures 1 
and 2) and excluded all items rated as implausible in both the 
learning and/or test phase from further analysis. Moreover, 
generated solutions were manually rated as correct or incor-
rect by the experimenter before data analysis (as in the origi-
nal RAT by Mednick, 1962, all items supposedly only had one 
possible correct solution). When participants solved a prob-
lem incorrectly, it could have a number of complicated effects 
on remembering the correct solution later on (e.g., cognitive 
interference between the correct and incorrect solutions dur-
ing encoding/retrieval). Such incorrectly solved trials were 
rare and were therefore excluded from all statistical analyses.
Task and procedure
The experiment consisted of two sessions: a learning phase 
and a testing phase that was conducted one week after the 
learning phase. In the learning phase, participants were pre-
sented with CRA items and were either instructed to try to 
solve the items or just to try to understand the solution when 
it was provided. Since it has been reported that the genera-
tion effect is larger for incidental learning (Bertsch et al., 
2007), participants were not informed about the memory 
test but were told that the second session would be similar 
to the first one. In the testing phase, memory for the items 
was tested with direct and indirect tests. Both sessions were 
held in the same dimly lit behavioral testing room and with 
the same apparatus. Before the start of each session, partici-
pants were handed written instructions which they summa-
rized verbally for the experimenter to make sure they had 
understood everything correctly. While the experiment was 
running, the experimenter sat in an adjacent room, seeing a 
display with the identical stimulation provided to the partici-
pant, and jotting down their oral responses.
Learning phase. In the learning phase (see Figure 1), partici-
pants were informed that there would be two versions of tri-
als: those in which the correct compound word for the triad 
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had to be found within a time limit of 20 s (chance to gen-
erate: generate and fail-to-generate conditions) and others 
in which the solution word was given and the task was to 
understand how the solution could be used to create com-
pound words with each of the triad words (read condition). 
The total presentation duration of the item was held constant 
(33 s) across the three different levels of GENERATION 
(generate, fail-to-generate, read) to avoid the duration for 
processing items as a confound for memory performance 
differences between conditions.2
In trials with a chance to generate the solution, the 
problem, that is, the three stacked triad words on top of a 
question mark in place of the solution, was presented for 
a maximum of 20 s or until a response was made. Participants 
were instructed to press the spacebar as soon as they came 
up with the solution word (e.g. “table”) and to speak it out 
loud immediately after button press. The interval for the oral 
response was 3 s, during which the question mark was high-
lighted in green. Immediately after, the question mark was 
replaced by the solution word, which was presented for the 
remainder of 33 s (which was calculated as 30 s minus the 
response time as depicted in Figure 1). It was emphasized 
that they only press the button when they were ready to 
speak out the answer. Participants were instructed to pay 
further attention to the item on the screen until item offset.
When no response was made within the time limit (fail-
to-generate condition), the solution word was presented in 
place of the question mark for a maximum of 10 s or until 
a response was made. Participants were instructed to press 
the space bar and read the solution word out loud as soon as 
they understood it. After the button press, the solution word 
was highlighted in green to indicate the oral response should 
be made. This display was presented for the remainder of the 
33 s, which was calculated as 13 s minus the response time 
from the first solution display.
In the read condition, the procedure was the same except 
that there was no search phase, but the solution was presented 
immediately with the triad. Within the first 20 s, participants 
indicated their comprehension of the solution by pressing the 
space bar, followed by reading the solution word out loud. 
Again, the button press changed the color of the solution word 
which was highlighted in green. This display remained active 
for the remainder of the 33 s which was calculated as 30 s minus 
the response time to the first display of triad and solution.
Figure 1. 
Learning phase. Example trials of the three generation conditions (generate, fail-to-generate, read). Stimulus presentation had the 
same duration for all conditions (33 s total) and in each condition, the solution had to be spoken out loud.
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Oral responses had to be made in all three conditions (gener-
ate, fail-to-generate, read) to avoid the additional encoding based 
on speech production as a potential confound for later memory 
differences. Either the question mark (generate trials) or the 
solution (fail-to-generate and read trials) changed color from 
white to green to indicate the interval for speech upon press-
ing space. Following the item presentation, participants were 
asked if they had an Aha! experience and answered with “yes” 
or “no” by pressing the left or right arrow key (assignment of 
the arrow keys was counterbalanced across participants). After 
button press, the next display was shown in which participants 
were asked how they felt when they understood the solution. 
Participants answered on a 5-point smiley scale as explained in 
the materials section. They could navigate to the chosen smiley 
via the arrow keys, with the currently chosen smiley highlighted 
by a red frame. Pressing the space bar confirmed their choice 
and led to the next display. Lastly, participants were asked if 
they thought of the solution as plausible, answering with “yes” 
or “no” (arrow keys). This button press ended the trial. All trials 
started with a fixation cross (0.5 s). The task consisted of 135 tri-
als, including three practice trials. Two short breaks of approxi-
mately 5 min were made after groups of 45 trials.
Test phase. One week later and approximately at the same time 
of day as the learning phase, participants were tested for 
their memory. They were presented with the 135 old CRA 
items from the learning phase as well as 45 new ones, result-
ing in a total of 180 trials. The task mainly corresponded to the 
chance-to-generate condition of the learning phase, that is, 
the trial timing was similar and participants were instructed to 
try to solve the problem within a time limit of 20 s (see Figure 2). 
It was emphasized that participants should not try to recall the 
solution but rather just try to solve the item regardless of whether 
they thought of it as old or new (indirect test to measure primar-
ily involuntary memory; Richardson-Klavehn, 2010; Schott et al., 
2005). Instead of the Aha! question and the affective rating, par-
ticipants were then asked if they recognized the item from the last 
session (“yes” or “no” answer via arrow keys). The button press led 
to the last display in which participants were again asked if they 
found the solution plausible (“yes” or “no” answer via arrow keys). 
There were two short breaks after groups of 60 trials.
Data analysis
All items rated as implausible were discarded from the 
analysis. First, data were descriptively analyzed in regard 
to our true independent, manipulated variable, that is, 
chance-to-solve versus no-chance-to-solve, and the objec-
tive dependent variables for memory performance, that is, 
solution rates of old items and recognition rates of old items. 
Secondly, inferential statistics were computed based on post-
hoc splits of the chance-to-solve condition into generate (cor-
rect solutions only, incorrect solutions were discarded from 
analysis) and fail-to-generate (no solution within the time 
limit). Additionally, all GENERATION conditions (generate, 
fail-to-generate, read) were further split into Aha! and no 
Aha!, based on the subjective ratings of the participants. For 
this analysis, all incorrect trials were also excluded. Data 
were analyzed for both memory measures as dependent vari-
ables and also for the subjective measure of the emotional 
response rating as a dependent variable using 3 × 2 repeated-
measures ANOVAs with factors GENERATION (generate, 
fail-to-generate, read) and AHA (Aha!, no Aha!). In case of sig-
nificant violations of the sphericity assumption, Greenhouse-
Geisser (1959) corrected F and p values, the correction 
parameter epsilon (ε), and uncorrected degrees of freedom are 
reported. Partial eta squared (ηp
2) and Cohen’s d are reported as 
measures of effect size for all ANOVAs and all t-tests, respec-
tively. For the emotional rating analysis, the median per partici-
pant was used before analysis of the means across participants.
resuLTs
Plausibility ratings revealed that .96 (SD = .05) of all old items 
were rated as plausible in both learning and test phase, and 
.91 (SD = .07) of all new items were rated as plausible in the 
test phase. In the learning phase, a solution was generated 
to .43 (SD = .12) of all chance-to-solve items. Of all gener-
ated solutions, .86 (SD = .09) were correct. After discarding 
all incorrectly generated solutions, .45 (SD = .10) of all 
chance-to-solve items were correctly generated (from here on, 
generate refers to correct solutions only) and in the remaining 
.55 no solution was generated at all (fail-to-generate condition). 
Figure 2. 
Memory test of Experiment 1. An indirect (solving old and new items) and a direct memory test (old/new recognition) were applied. 
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The number of items per level of GENERATION was therefore 
relatively balanced (means of 40.5 items generated, 49.5 items 
fail-to-generate, 45 items read). The mean frequency of all 
combinations of GENERATION (generated, fail-to-generate, 
read) and AHA (Aha!, no Aha!) can be found in Table 2.
Solution rates of old items (indirect memory test measure) 
At first, all 21 participants are considered. Old items had 
a significantly higher solution rate (.64, SD = .09) than 
new items (.33, SD = .10) for all participants [t(20) = 14.6, 
p < .001, Cohen’s d = 3.197], corroborating that learn-
ing occurred. Participants solved .64 (SD = .09) of the 
chance-to-solve items at test (collapsed over generate and 
fail-to-generate) and .63 (SD = .10) of the no-chance-to-solve 
(read) items. However, the difference between the relationships of 
chance-to-solve and no-chance-to-solve to later memory 
becomes evident when splitting chance-to-solve for generate 
and fail-to-generate, as was done in the analysis below.
To investigate the relationship between AHA 
(Aha!, no Aha!) and GENERATION (generate, fail- 
to-generate, read) and later solution rates during testing, a 2 × 
3 repeated-measures ANOVA was run with the solution rate 
of old items as dependent variable. For this analysis, the five 
participants who had zero trials in one of the combinations 
were discarded. As shown in Figure 3A, there was no effect of 
AHA, but a main effect of GENERATION [F(2,30) = 26.72, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .640]. For the means and standard deviations 
(SD) that were used in this and all other ANOVAs, please 
refer to Table 3. Not surprisingly, when participants gener-
ated a solution for problems during learning, they had a high 
probability of solving them again during testing, whereas the 
solution rate during test was lowest for problems where par-
ticipants failed to generate a solution during learning. As can 
be seen in Figure 3A, the read condition scored in between. 
This pattern was validated via post-hoc tests. Generate (.86, 
SD = .09) was associated with significantly higher solution 
rates at test compared to fail-to-generate (.46, SD = .12) 
[t(15) = 14.9, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 3.875] and compared to 
read (.64, SD = .10) [t(15) = 9.03, p < .000, Cohen’s d = 2.278]. 
Fail-to-generate was associated with significantly lower solu-
tion rates at test than read [t(15) = 6.63, p < .001, Cohen’s d 
= 1.674]. It should be noted that even though the lowest solu-
tion rate was seen for the fail-to-generate condition it was 
Condition Mean SD
P(generate ∩ no Aha! | chance to generate) .21 .14
P(generate ∩ Aha! | chance to generate) .24 .18
P(fail-to-generate ∩ no Aha! | chance to generate) .14 .16
P(fail-to-generate ∩ Aha! | chance to generate) .41 .14
P(no Aha! | read) .69 .35
P(Aha! | read) .31 .35
Table 2
Mean conditional frequencies of all conditions in Experiment 1 (n = 21).
Generation
Experiment Test 
measure
Aha! Generate Fail-to-generate Read
Experiment 1 Indirect Aha! 0.79 (0.16) 0.48 (0.13) 0.51 (0.31)
(N = 16) No Aha! 0.82 (0.26) 0.39 (0.26) 0.67 (0.13)
Direct Aha! 0.82 (0.20) 0.86 (0.15) 0.74 (0.24)
Emotional Aha! 1.09 (0.52) 0.44 (0.63) 0.69 (0.48)
Response No Aha! 0.78 (0.55) 0.00 (0.66) 0.31 (0.48)
Experiment 2 Direct Aha! 0.45 (0.17) 0.35 (0.15) 0.27 (0.32)
(N = 14) No Aha! 0.38 (0.20) 0.36 (0.21) 0.26 (0.15)
Emotional Aha! 1.18 (0.46) 0.46 (0.57) 0.75 (0.55)
Response No Aha! 0.68 (0.61) -0.18 (0.37) 0.07 (0.27)
Table 3
Mean conditional frequencies of all conditions in Experiment 1 (n = 21). Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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still marginally higher than the solution rate of new items 
during testing [t(15) = 2.02, p = .062, Cohen’s d = 0.657].
The difference between generate and fail-to-generate sug-
gests a possible selection effect for item difficulty. In other 
words, it could have been that only easy items and their solu-
tions were learned, and easy items more often landed in the 
generate condition. This issue was addressed empirically by 
making a distinction between difficult and easy items based on 
a median split of the generation rates using our unpublished 
normative data (i.e., independent data). Indeed, significantly 
more difficult items landed in the fail-to-generate compared to 
the generate condition [.66 (SD = .05) vs. .29 (SD = .06); t(15) 
= 19.05, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 6.428]. However, easy items were 
not necessarily learned better. To compare the learning rates 
for difficult and easy items, solution rates at test were com-
pared for old difficult and old easy items, as well as new diffi-
cult and new easy items. The learning rate was operationalized 
as the solution rate for old minus new items for difficult and 
easy items, respectively. A dependent samples t-test between 
the learning rate for difficult versus easy items revealed no 
statistical difference [.14 (SD = .07) vs. .17 (SD = .08); t(15) 
= 1.16, p = .263, Cohen’s d = 0.394]. Thus, critically, the differ-
ence between fail-to-generate and generate cannot simply be 
attributed to difficult items being learned more poorly.
Figure 3. 
Memory performance in Experiment 1. A. Mean solution rate of old items during 
the indirect memory test. The solution rate of new items at test is depicted for 
comparison. B. Mean hit rate during the direct memory test for solutions pre-
sented problems. The false alarm rate (new items incorrectly identified as old) is 
depicted for comparison.
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Recognition memory for solutions presented with problems (direct memory 
test measure) 
In total, .82 (SD = .15) of all old items were correctly recog-
nized as such. After subtracting false alarms, discrimination 
was still at .64 (SD = .15). Participants correctly recognized 
.88 (SD = .14) of old chance-to-solve items and .72 (SD 
= .19) of old no-chance-to-solve items. Here, generate and 
fail-to-generate did not differ in regard to later memory as 
becomes evident from the analysis below.
As with the solution rate during test, a 2 × 3 repeated-
measures ANOVA with factors AHA and GENERATION 
was run with hit rate as the dependent variable. For this 
analysis, the five participants with empty cells were again 
discarded. Again, we found a main effect of GENERATION 
[F(2,30) = 5.52, p = .009, ηp
2 = .269], but no effect of AHA. 
In contrast to the solution rates of old items, both gener-
ate (.85, SD = .15) and fail-to-generate (.85, SD = .15) led to 
significantly higher hit rates than read (.69, SD = .20) [t(15) 
= 4.88, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.313 and t(15) = 6.74, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 2.050], but they did not differ from each other 
[t(15) = 0.011, p = .992, Cohen’s d = 0.002] (see Figure 3B). 
This suggests that attempting to solve a CRAT item enhances 
later memory for it, even if generation fails, when memory 
is tested with a recognition memory test. However both the 
triad and the solution were presented during the recogni-
tion memory test, and it is therefore unclear whether only 
the triad, the solution, or both might have been encoded 
successfully. Moreover, hit rates appear to be at ceiling for 
generate and fail-to-generate, which might account for the 
absence of a statistical difference.
Emotional response. To investigate whether the emotional 
response differed in quality depending on the generation 
of the solution or whether an Aha! experience was reported 
during comprehension, a 2 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA 
with factors AHA (Aha!, no Aha!) and GENERATION 
(generated, fail-to-generate, read) was computed for the 
median of the affective rating. Again, the five participants 
with empty cells were excluded from analysis. Main effects 
of GENERATION [F(2,30) = 11.60, p < .001, ηp
2 = .436] and 
AHA [F(1,15) = 15.00, p = .002, ηp
2 = .500] were revealed. As 
can be seen in Figure 5, Aha! (0.774, SD = 0.39) was rated 
significantly higher than no Aha! (0.51, SD = 0.35) [t(15) 
= 4.37, p = .001, Cohen’s d = 0.608]. Generation (0.94, SD 
= 0.47) was also accompanied by a significantly more posi-
tive response in comparison to fail-to-generate (0.22, SD 
= 0.54) [t(15) = 4.11, p = .001, Cohen’s d = 1.029] and to read 
(0.50, SD = 0.41) [t(15) = 2.15, p = .048, Cohen’s d = 0.580], 
while fail-to-generate received lower affective ratings than 
read [t(15) = 2.15, p = .048, Cohen’s d = 0.550].
discussion
The results revealed that although generate and Aha! were 
accompanied by a positive emotional response, only the fac-
tor GENERATION showed a significant relationship to later 
Figure 4. 
Emotional response in Experiment 1. Depicted is the mean of the individual median emotional re-
sponse as measured by a rating on a 5-point scale during the comprehension of the solution.
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memory. When an Aha! experience was reported, this was 
accompanied by a relatively more positive emotional response 
than no Aha! at all levels of GENERATION. This supports 
the notion that the Aha! experience induces a positive feel-
ing—even when it cannot be pride of correctly solving a CRAT 
problem. As for GENERATION, generate was accompanied 
by the most positive emotional response, followed by read, 
with the least positive, relatively neutral emotional response for 
fail-to-generate. While the emotional response to successful 
generation can probably be explained by pride, the least positive 
response may be due to disappointment of not being able to solve 
the item. However, since subjects were not asked about the reasons 
for these feelings, this result could be investigated in future studies.
Despite the difference between Aha! and no Aha! in regard 
to the emotional response, AHA did not show a significant rela-
tionship to later memory; only GENERATION did. Moreover, 
depending on whether memory was tested with an indirect or 
direct test, the ordinal ranking between conditions differed. 
When the requirement was to solve old items (indirect test), the 
pattern was generate > read > fail-to-generate, whereas the pat-
tern seen in previous studies was generate = fail-to-generate > 
read (although in a free recall task; the first current study is appar-
ently the first to use an indirect memory test). When the require-
ment was to recognize the complete item (problem + solution; 
direct test), it was generate = fail-to-generate > read, whereas the 
pattern was generate > fail-to-generate> read in previous stud-
ies. On first view, this result suggests that learning from CRAT 
problem solving is indeed a special case of generation. However, 
since the apparent equality between generate and fail-to-generate 
for the direct memory test may have been due to ceiling effects, 
a second experiment made old/new decisions more difficult by 
testing the solution word without its triad as context.
experiMenT 2
To eliminate the ceiling effects of the first experiment, the 
second experiment presented only the solution word as part 
of a guess/remember/know recognition memory task (see 
Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). Unfortunately, too 
few remember responses were given, so remember and know 
response categories had to be collapsed. The second experi-
ment corresponded to the first one, except for the testing 
phase (Figure 2). Below only methodological differences to 
the first experiment are described.
MeThods
Participants 
Twenty-two German native speakers (8 male and 14 female) 
with a mean age of 24.6 years (SD = 2.5, range: 21–32) par-
ticipated in the experiment. Due to empty cells, only 14 
participants could be included in the GENERATION × AHA 
analyses. The remaining participants had a mean age of 24.7 
years, and five were male; nine were female.
Task and procedure (testing phase) 
Participants were presented with solution words of all old 
items as well as with solution words of new items3 and were 
tested for their recognition memory (see Figure 5). After the 
presentation of a fixation cross (0.5 s), single solution words 
were shown in the center of the screen and participants were 
instructed to decide whether the word was old or new by press-
ing the left or the right arrow key. The display remained until 
button press. Participants were instructed to only choose new 
if they were sure about it and to choose old when they were 
sure about it as well as when they were insecure. If participants 
chose new, the next trial started. If they chose old they were 
asked to indicate whether their decision was just a guess or if 
they knew or even remembered the solution word. Participants 
were instructed to choose know if they were sure that it was old 
but did not remember any further context information, and 
to choose remember when they did remember some context 
information (e.g., their thoughts when they saw the solution 
in the learning phase or even the related triad). They should 
Figure 5. 
Memory test of Experiment 2: Exemplary trial.
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choose guess if they could not categorize the item into one of 
the other categories. Participants made their choice by press-
ing the right, down, or left arrow key. If they chose guess or 
know, the next trial started. If they chose remember, they were 
asked to describe the remembered information to the experi-
menter, who wrote it down. By pressing the space bar, partici-
pants could end the trial and proceed. Again, 135 trials were 
presented during encoding and 180 during retrieval. Short 
breaks were made after groups of 45 and 60 trials respectively.
Analysis 
In the second experiment, the recognition rate for solution 
words was the only measure of memory performance. It was 
planned to analyze the relationship between GENERATION 
(generated, fail-to-generate, read) × AHA (Aha!, no Aha!) 
for remember and know responses separately. However, this 
analysis was not possible because remember responses were, 
unexpectedly, scarce (possibly due to the long retention 
interval and the use of single-word test stimuli). Remember 
and know responses were therefore collapsed, resulting in 
only one measure of recognition memory for old items (i.e., 
correct “old” responses). False alarms (i.e., incorrect “old” 
responses to new items) were treated correspondingly. Guess 
responses were excluded from the analysis, because they 
may reflect different decision strategies than true recogni-
tion (Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). Also, as in 
Experiment 1, items rated as implausible and incorrect gen-
erations were excluded from analysis.
resuLTs
Plausibility ratings revealed that .93 (SD = .05) of all old 
items were rated as plausible during the learning phase and 
included in the analysis. In the learning phase, a solution was 
generated to .36 (SD = .06) of all chance-to-solve items. Only 
.05 (SD = .05) of all chance-to-solve items were solved incor-
rectly. After discarding all incorrect generations, .41 (SD 
= .05) of all chance-to-solve items were correctly generated.
Recognition memory for solutions (direct memory test measure) 
Mean hit rate was .59 (SD = .23). Corrected for false alarms, 
discrimination was still at .38 (SD = .18), although consider-
ably lower than that in Experiment 1. Of all chance-to-solve 
Figure 6. 
Memory performance in Experiment 2. Mean hit rate during the direct recognition memory test for solutions. 
The false alarm rate (new items incorrectly identified as old) is depicted for comparison.
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items (generate, fail-to-generate), .66 (SD = .22) and .48 
(SD = .29) of all no-chance-to-solve items (read) were cor-
rectly recognized as old. When splitting chance-to-solve into 
generate and fail-to-generate, it becomes evident that those 
conditions differ significantly in regard to later recognition 
memory, as revealed in the analysis below.
A 2 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA with factors 
AHA (Aha!, no Aha!) and GENERATION (generate, 
fail-to-generate, read) was run with hit rate as dependent 
variable. Partially replicating the result of Experiment 1, 
only a main effect of GENERATION was found [F(2,26) 
= 5.68, p = .013, ηp
2 = .304, ε = .871]. As can be seen in Figure 
6, read (.26, SD = .15) differed significantly from generate (.42, 
SD = .15) and fail-to-generate (.34, SD = .14) as revealed by 
post-hoc dependent-samples t-tests [generate vs. read: t(13) 
= 3.96, p = .002, Cohen’s d = 1.060; fail-to-generate vs. read: t(13) 
= 2.10, p = .056, Cohen’s d = 0.563]. In contrast to Experiment 
1, there was also a significant difference between generate and 
fail-to-generate [t(13) = 2.21, p = .046, Cohen’s d = 0.592].
Emotional response 
The same 2 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA as above with the 
median of the affective rating as dependent variable for indi-
vidual participants was computed to investigate whether the 
emotional response differs in quality depending on AHA and 
GENERATION. Only the 14 participants without empty cells 
were included. As shown in Figure 7, and generally replicating 
the effect pattern from Experiment 1, there were main effects 
of GENERATION [F(2,26) = 17.47, p < .001, ηp
2 = .573] and 
AHA [F(1,13) = 58.60, p < .001, ηp
2 = .818], with higher rat-
ings for generate (0.93, SD = 0.48) than fail-to-generate (0.14, 
SD = 0.38) [t(13) = 4.58, p = .001, Cohen’s d = 1.644], higher 
ratings for fail-to-generate than for read (0.41, SD = 0.32) 
[t(13) = 2.26, p = .042, Cohen’s d = 0.767], and higher ratings 
for Aha! (.80, SD = .34) than no Aha! (.40, SD = .33) [t(13) 
= 5.69, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.168].
discussion
While emotional response showed the same independent rela-
tionships to GENERATION and AHA as in Experiment 1, the 
direct memory test used in the current experiment revealed 
different results than the direct memory test in Experiment 
1. First, there was no longer a ceiling effect. Second, not only 
did generate and fail-to-generate differ significantly from 
read, but also from each other, leading to the pattern: gen-
erate > fail-to-generate > read. This is the same pattern that 
one would expect from Slamecka’s and Fevreiski’s study on 
the classical generation effect (Slamecka & Fevreiski, 1983). It 
further suggests that recognition performance is not depen-
dent on the exposure time to the solution during encoding, 
which was longest for read (presented for the whole 33 s), 
shortest for fail-to-generate (presented for 13 s), and medium 
for generate (presented for approximately 25 s, depending on 
the solution time, which had a mean of 8 s).
GeneraL discussion
The GeneraTion effecT in probLeM soLVinG
The current study investigated the relationship between prob-
lem solving and long-term memory formation in a verbal 
problem-solving task. The main focus was on the generation 
Figure 7. 
Emotional response in Experiment 2. As can be seen, the pattern generally corresponds to the one from Experiment 1.
docs.lib.purdue.edu/jps  2016 | Volume 9
J. M. Kizilirmak, B. Wiegmann, and A. Richardson-Klavehn A Special Case of Generation Effect
73
effect, a beneficial effect of generating solutions on later 
memory, and whether the generation effect in problem- 
solving tasks that are used to study insight (using the example 
of the CRAT) represents a special case of the generation effect 
as observed in traditional memory studies. Memory was 
compared for generate, fail-to-generate, and read conditions, 
and in relation to subjective reports of Aha! experiences. In 
addition, we investigated whether comprehending the solu-
tion differed not only in terms of later memory, but also in 
terms of the emotional response, depending on the generate 
/fail-to-generate/read and the Aha!/no Aha! variables.
Whereas previous studies showed that both the genera-
tion of a solution and the subjective feeling of Aha! were pos-
itively related to later memory performance, in this study a 
relationship was only found for generation. More specifically, 
generating a solution was associated with the best later mem-
ory performance as measured by both indirect and direct 
memory tests. Memory performance for fail-to-generate and 
read items differed depending on the type of test. The over-
all pattern for the indirect test (solution rate of old items) in 
Experiment 1 was generate > read > fail-to-generate, whereas 
for the direct memory test (old/new recognition of the solu-
tion) it was generate > fail-to-generate > read (when ceiling 
effects were eliminated in Experiment 2). As summarized 
in the “Introduction,” a generation study in which people 
were asked to generate the opposites of words compared 
fail-to-generate with generate and read conditions and 
reported that fail-to-generate is equal to generate for the free 
recall of the target item (generate = fail-to-generate > read), 
but not for recognition memory, where fail-to-generate 
was associated with a poorer performance (generate > fail- 
to-generate > read) (Slamecka & Fevreiski, 1983). Slamecka 
and Fevreiski interpreted this finding as a result from 
fail-to-generate corresponding to incomplete generation, 
whereby the item’s semantic attributes were activated simi-
larly as in a generate condition. Successful generation is con-
sidered to consist of two stages: generating adequate semantic 
attributes of the solution and arriving at the respective lexical 
entry that also includes surface features of the word. Since 
recognition memory relies not only on semantic, but also 
on surface and processing, fail-to-generate falls short in this 
regard compared to generate. In regard to CRAT problem 
solving, although semantic-associative processing in the 
case of fail-to-generate may not lead closer to the solution, it 
facilitates later recognition of the solution compared to read, 
where only a minimum of semantic processing is required to 
comprehend the presented solution.
In our indirect memory test, that is, trying to solve old 
items again at test, no memory advantage for fail-to-generate 
compared to read was found. In fact, items whose solutions 
had failed to be generated during encoding had a poorer 
solution performance at test than items whose solutions were 
read during encoding. These results are consistent with the 
idea that failing to generate the solution on CRAT problems 
may lead to interference between the correct solution and the 
incorrect solutions processed during failed problem-solving 
attempts (Kane & Anderson, 1978). The memory advantage 
for solving old CRAT items again when they were previously 
successfully generated, in comparison to fail-to-generate, is 
in line with the results of Dominowski and Buyer (2000). 
However, that study did not include a read condition.
Our findings are in support of the notion of Metcalfe 
(1986a), who reported considerable differences in the gen-
eration process for problem-solving tasks in comparison to 
classical generation tasks: While classical generation tasks 
require a search in memory for a specific solution (often a 
word), problem solving usually requires the construction of 
a novel solution that is only based on memory content. This 
may be one reason for differences in the generation effect in 
problem solving and more classical generation tasks.
The subjecTiVe aha! experience
Both the subjective Aha! experience and generation were 
independently associated with relatively more positive emo-
tional responses. As Sternberg (1969) suggested, such addi-
tivity might reflect different cognitive processes. Therefore, 
one interpretation of both generation and Aha! being inde-
pendently correlated with more positive responses is that 
different emotions may contribute to the positive feeling. 
This would also support the notion that the positive emo-
tion which accompanies the Aha! experience is not the pride 
of solving the problem (Gruber, 2005; Topolinski & Reber, 
2010). It has even been reported that this emotional response 
precedes the finding of a solution (Gruber, 2005). However, 
whether this positive emotional response truly is something 
other than pride needs to be investigated in studies that focus 
more on subjective reports such as those used by Danek and 
colleagues (2014). Nevertheless, only generation but not the 
Aha! experience was accompanied by enhanced later mem-
ory. The absence of a significant relationship between Aha! 
and later memory is in contrast with the results of Danek et 
al. (2013a) and Kizilirmak et al. (2015). A main difference 
between those two studies and the current one is the stimu-
lus material. Danek et al. used magic tricks and Kizilirmak 
et al. used Mooney images, that is, their stimulus material 
was of a more visual nature and may therefore have been 
more emotionally intriguing. The positive relationship of 
Aha! to later memory was larger for the presented videos 
of magic tricks than for the black and white Mooney images 
(Danek et al., 2013a; Danek, Fraps, von Müller, Grothe, & 
Öllinger, 2013b; Kizilirmak et al., 2015). It would be plausible 
that positive relationship between Aha! and the emotional 
response in the present study, which was also only half the 
size of the one for Mooney images (Kizilirmak et al., 2015), 
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was too weak to show a significant relationship with memory 
performance one week later. However, since the named stud-
ies (Danek et al., 2013a; Kizilirmak et al., 2015) may be the 
only two to have investigated the relationship between the 
subjective feeling of Aha! and later memory, more studies 
are needed to investigate the relationship between the type 
of problem-solving task, the emotional response to the solu-
tion, and later memory performance.
LiMiTaTions and differences froM preVious sTudies
A main limitation of the current study is that the problem-
solving task employed here is relatively artificial. It is a task 
very well suited for laboratory experiments in which many 
trials of the same type are needed. However, in compari-
son with insights experienced in real life, the sudden com-
prehension of the solution to an individual problem may 
not be nearly as compelling, and the individual trials may not 
be nearly as distinct. This hypothesis is consistent with the 
solution performance during the memory test being much 
poorer than in other studies on learning from insight, which 
looked at this measure using a small set of classic problems 
(Ash & Wiley, 2008) or a single problem such as the nine-dot 
problem (Ash et al., 2012; Dominowski & Buyer, 2000). In 
the current study, participants were presented with 135 trials 
of the same problem type. This way, each trial was not nearly 
as distinctive as the ones in the cited studies. Distinctiveness 
is known to be an important factor for later memory perfor-
mance (Eysenck, 1979).
Another limitation of this study is the difference in expo-
sure time of the solution across different levels of generation. 
Total trial time was held constant, representing a consider-
able methodological advantage; however, it was not possible 
to hold both the presentation time of the triad and the pre-
sentation time of the solution constant. The differences in 
exposure time to the solution may, therefore, have influenced 
later memory. For the direct memory test this potential con-
found is unproblematic, because the differences in recogni-
tion rates were not correlated with the exposure times. At 
encoding, the exposure-time pattern for the solution was 
read > generate > fail-to-generate, but on the later memory 
test the pattern was generate > fail-to-generate > read. For 
the indirect memory measure, the pattern of solution rates at 
test was generate > read > fail-to-generate. Although not an 
identical pattern to the exposure times at encoding, the poor 
test performance for fail-to-generate might indeed reflect the 
shortest exposure time at encoding. This possible confound-
ing factor should be evaluated in future studies.
Lastly, although participants were asked to make their 
Aha!/no Aha! decision for both generated and presented 
solutions, it may be that there were qualitative differences. 
Those differences may be confounded with the different lev-
els of generation, and later memory performance. However, 
the results of the analysis of the emotional response revealed 
that at least in regard to this qualitative feature, Aha! and 
generation were independent, suggesting that in this regard 
the quality of an Aha! experience is not confounded with the 
level of generation.
concLusions
The main finding was that the generation effect for CRAT 
problems shows a distinctive pattern of memory perfor-
mance depending on the type of test, that is, solving old 
items (indirect test) versus recognizing old items or solu-
tions (direct test). While even attempts to generate had an 
advantage over the read condition in recognition memory 
performance (generate > fail-to-generate > read), only when 
generation was successful did it enhance the solution rate 
of old items during test (generate > read > fail-to-generate). 
Our results suggest that, contrary to what has been proposed 
in typical generation studies, fail-to-generate does not nec-
essarily enhance later memory for the solution. Thus, the 
generation effect in problem-solving tasks such as the CRAT, 
in which a novel solution has to be constructed based on 
existing knowledge rather than just retrieving the solution 
from existing knowledge (typical generation studies), seems 
indeed to be a special case of the generation effect. Here, 
being exposed to a solution for a longer time (read) seems to 
be more helpful for solving the same problem later on than 
being presented with the solution after a failed attempt at 
problem solving. Whether this pattern holds also for other 
problem-solving tasks that have been used to study creativity 
and insight warrants further investigation. From an educa-
tional point of view, this result suggests that different learn-
ing strategies should be used depending on how knowledge 
is tested: When the solution has to be remembered upon the 
presentation of the problem (especially relevant for a free 
response test format), trying to solve the problem on one’s 
own during initial exposure to the problem is not always best.
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noTes
1. It should be noted that some classical generation tasks may 
also be solved by insight. One common task used in insight 
research and generation effect studies is solving anagrams 
(Bertsch et al., 2007; Kounios & Beeman, 2009; Metcalfe, 
1986b). In generation studies they are simple enough to 
be always solved, but the way the solution is found may 
sometimes be through sudden, not gradual, insight.
2. Holding the presentation time constant for both the prob-
lem and the solution in the same experiment was not 
possible. In the case of generation, the solution has to be 
presented directly after the participant comes up with 
it, because even if one would continue the display of the 
problem without the solution, the solution would be ac-
tive in the participant’s mind. Moreover, that procedure 
could have even more complex consequences, such as the 
participants having time to question the solution they 
came up with, which would make any clear conclusions 
about encoding differences due to the GENERATION 
conditions themselves impossible.
3. New items consisted of a subsample of CRA items, the 
same as in Experiment 1. Thus, even though the triad of 
new items was never presented in Experiment 2, the solu-
tion had valid remote associations.
references
Anderson, A. K., Yamaguchi, Y., Grabski, W., & Lacka, D. (2006). 
Emotional memories are not all created equal: Evidence for 
selective memory enhancement. Learning & Memory, 13(6), 
711–718. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/lm.388906
Ash, I. K., Jee, B. D., & Wiley, J. (2012). Investigating insight 
as sudden learning. Journal of Problem Solving, 4(2), 1–27. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.7771/1932-6246.1123
Ash, I. K., & Wiley, J. (2008). Hindsight bias in insight and 
mathematical problem solving: Evidence of different 
reconstruction mechanisms for metacognitive versus situ-
ational judgments. Memory & Cognition, 36(4), 822–837. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/MC.36.4.822
Bertsch, S., Pesta, B. J., Wiscott, R., & McDaniel, M. A. (2007). 
The generation effect: A meta-analytic review. Memory 
& Cognition, 35(2), 201–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758 
/BF03193441
Bowden, E. M., & Jung-Beeman, M. (1998). Getting the right 
idea: Semantic activation in the right hemisphere may 
help solve insight problems. Psychological Science, 9(6), 
435–440. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00082
Bowden, E. M., & Jung-Beeman, M. (2003). Normative data 
for 144 compound remote associate problems. Behavior 
Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 35(4), 634–
639. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/BF03195543
Bowers, K. S., Regehr, G., Balthazard, C., & Parker, K. 
(1990). Intuition in the context of discovery. Cognitive 
Psychology, 22(1), 72–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0010 
-0285(90)90004-N
Burns, D. J. (1992). The consequences of generation. Journal 
of Memory and Language, 31(5), 615–633. http://dx.doi 
.org/10.1016/0749-596X(92)90031-R
Chein, J. M., & Weisberg, R. W. (2014). Working memory 
and insight in verbal problems: Analysis of compound 
remote associates. Memory & Cognition, 42(1), 67–83. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-013-0343-4
Collins, A. M., & Loftus, E. F. (1975). A spreading-activation 
theory of semantic processing. Psychological Review, 82(6), 
407–428. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0033-295X.82.6.407
Cranford, E. A., & Moss, J. (2010). Investigating insight using 
compound remote associate problems. In S. Ohlsson & 
R. Catrambone (Eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual 
Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1768–
1773). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
Cranford, E. A., & Moss, J. (2012). Is insight always the same? 
A protocol analysis of insight in compound remote associ-
ate problems. Journal of Problem Solving, 4(2), 128–153. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.7771/1932-6246.1129
Danek, A. H., Fraps, T., von Müller, A., Grothe, B., & Öllinger, 
M. (2013a). Aha! experiences leave a mark: Facilitated 
recall of insight solutions. Psychological Research, 77(5), 
659–669. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00426-012-0454-8
Danek, A. H., Fraps, T., von Müller, A., Grothe, B., & Öllinger, 
M. (2013b). Working wonders? Investigating insight with 
magic tricks. Cognition, 130(2), 174–185. http://dx.doi 
.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.11.003
Danek, A. H., Fraps, T., von Müller, A., Grothe, B., & Öllinger, 
M. (2014). It’s a kind of magic—What self-reports can 
reveal about the phenomenology of insight problem solv-
ing. Frontiers in Psychology, 5(1408), 1–11. http://dx.doi 
.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01408
Dominowski, R. L., & Buyer, L. S. (2000). Retention of prob-
lem solutions: The re-solution effect. American Journal of 
Psychology, 113(2), 249. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1423730
Eysenck, M. W. (1979). Depth, elaboration, and distinctive-
ness. In L. S. Cermak & F. I. M. Craik (Eds.), Levels of 
processing in human memory (pp. 89–118). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Gardiner, J. M., Java, R. I., & Richardson-Klavehn, A. (1996). How 
level of processing really influences awareness in recognition 
memory. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology/Revue 
Canadienne de Psychologie Expérimentale, 50(1), 114–122. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1196-1961.50.1.114
Gardiner, J. M., Ramponi, C., & Richardson-Klavehn, A. 
(1998). Experiences of remembering, knowing, and 
guessing. Consciousness and Cognition, 7(1), 1–26. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1006/ccog.1997.0321
docs.lib.purdue.edu/jps  2016 | Volume 9
J. M. Kizilirmak, B. Wiegmann, and A. Richardson-Klavehn A Special Case of Generation Effect
76
Gardiner, J. M., & Richardson-Klavehn, A. (2000). 
Remembering and knowing. In E. Tulving & F. I. M. Craik 
(Eds.), The Oxford handbook of memory (pp. 229–244). 
New York: Oxford University Press.
Greenhouse, S. W., & Geisser, S. (1959). On methods in the 
analysis of profile data. Psychometrika, 24(2), 95–112. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02289823
Gruber, H. E. (2005). Insight and affect in the history of sci-
ence. In R. J. Sternberg & J. E. Davidson (Eds.), The nature 
of insight (pp. 397–431). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Hoffman, J. E., & Subramaniam, B. (1995). The role of 
visual attention in saccadic eye movements. Perception & 
Psychophysics, 57(6), 787–795. Retrieved from http://www 
.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7651803
Jung-Beeman, M., Bowden, E. M., Haberman, J., Frymiare, J. 
L., Arambel-Liu, S., Greenblatt, R., . . . Kounios, J. (2004). 
Neural activity when people solve verbal problems with 
insight. PLoS Biology, 2(4), E97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371 
/journal.pbio.0020097
Kane, J. H., & Anderson, R. C. (1978). Depth of processing 
and interference effects in the learning and remember-
ing of sentences. Journal of Educational Psychology, 70(4), 
626–635. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0022-0663.70.4.626
Kizilirmak, J. M., Galvao Gomes da Silva, J., Imamoglu, F., & 
Richardson-Klavehn, A. (2015). Generation and the sub-
jective feeling of “aha!” are independently related to learn-
ing from insight. Psychological Research. http://dx.doi 
.org/10.1007/s00426-015-0697-2
Knoblich, G., Ohlsson, S., Haider, H., & Rhenius, D. (1999). 
Constraint relaxation and chunk decomposition in insight 
problem solving. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 25(6), 1534–1555. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.25.6.1534
Kounios, J., & Beeman, M. (2009). The aha! moment: The 
cognitive neuroscience of insight. Current Directions 
in Psychological Science, 18(4), 210–216. http://dx.doi 
.org/10.1111/j.1467-8721.2009.01638.x
Kounios, J., Frymiare, J. L., Bowden, E. M., Fleck, J. I., 
Subramaniam, K., Parrish, T. B., & Jung-Beeman, M. (2006). 
The prepared mind: Neural activity prior to problem pre-
sentation predicts subsequent solution by sudden insight. 
Psychological Science, 17(10), 882–890. http://dx.doi.org 
/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01798.x
McElroy, L. A., & Slamecka, N. J. (1982). Memorial conse-
quences of generating nonwords: Implications for seman-
tic-memory interpretations of the generation effect. 
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 21(3), 249–
259. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0022-5371(82)90593-X
Mednick, S. A. (1962). The associative basis of the creative 
process. Psychological Review, 69(3), 220–232. http://dx 
.doi.org/10.1037/h0048850
Metcalfe, J. (1986a). Feeling of knowing in memory and 
problem solving. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 12(2), 288–294. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.12.2.288
Metcalfe, J. (1986b). Premonitions of insight predict impend-
ing error. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 12(4), 623–634. http://dx.doi 
.org/10.1037/0278-7393.12.4.623
Richardson-Klavehn, A. (2010). Priming, automatic rec-
ollection, and control of retrieval: Toward an integra-
tive retrieval architecture. In J. H. Mace (Ed.), The act of 
remembering: Toward an understanding of how we recall 
the past (pp. 111–179). Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
Richardson-Klavehn, A., & Bjork, R. A. (1988). Measures of 
memory. Annual Review of Psychology, 39(1), 475–543. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ps.39.020188.002355
Schott, B. H., Henson, R. N., Richardson-Klavehn, A., 
Becker, C., Thoma, V., Heinze, H.-J., & Düzel, E. (2005). 
Redefining implicit and explicit memory: The functional 
neuroanatomy of priming, remembering, and control of 
retrieval. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
of the United States of America, 102(4), 1257–1262. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0409070102
Slamecka, N. J., & Fevreiski, J. (1983). The generation effect 
when generation fails. Journal of Verbal Learning and 
Verbal Behavior, 22(2), 153–163. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016 
/S0022-5371(83)90112-3
Slamecka, N. J., & Graf, P. (1978). The generation effect: 
Delineation of a phenomenon. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Learning & Memory, 4(6), 592–604. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0278-7393.4.6.592
Sternberg, S. (1969). The discovery of processing stages: 
Extensions of Donders’ method. Acta Psychologica, 30, 276–
315. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0001-6918(69)90055-9
Topolinski, S., & Reber, R. (2010). Gaining insight into the “aha” 
experience. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 19(6), 
402–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721410388803
Yonelinas, A. P., & Ritchey, M. (2015). The slow forgetting 
of emotional episodic memories: An emotional binding 
account. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 19(5), 259–267. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2015.02.009
